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"THE UNCONSCIOUS IS A JURIST": 




On Friday the fourth of May, 1984, while watching the Prime 
Minister of Quebec speaking on television, a disaffected young corporal 
in the Canadian army formed the idea of massacring the government 
of Quebec. Denis Lortie subsequently described this initial impulse in 
terms of a desire to attack the national Assembly and eliminate the 
ruling Parti quebequois, a party which had "done harm to the French 
language." He would thus "destroy something which wanted to destroy 
the French language." In various other formulations, Lortie expressed 
a wish to save the language by killing the government: "I will do some 
harm so as to do some good."1 
Sometime earlier, at the end of April, Lortie had applied for leave 
from his base in Ottawa. Claiming that he wanted to see his wife, he 
had tried to negotiate a leave of three days from his immediate 
superior, Sergeant Chenier. His request was refused and Lortie 
subsequently admitted that during the course of his application being 
refused, something strange had happened: he had seen the face of his 
father standing opposite him in the guise of Sergeant Chenier. 
Lortie, however, was granted one day of leave, for Monday the 
seventh of May. On Saturday the fifth of May he conducted an 
inventory of the arsenal at the base and checked out his exercise gear, 
including his rifle, his gas mask and a first-aid kit. On Sunday the 
sixth of May he drove to Quebec, checked into a motel and 
reconnoitered the Citadel looking for a place to kill and to be killed. On 
Monday the seventh he visited the national Assembly building with a 
tour group and then purchased a dictaphone and three cassettes. 
Sometime later that day, Lortie recorded three separate messages on 
these tapes announcing his murderous plans and his own imminent 
• Birkbeck College, University of London. 
1 Pierre Legendre, LE CRIME DU CAPORAL LoRTIE: TRAin: SUR LE PERE 95 (Paris: 
Fayard, 1989Xhereinafter, LoRTIE). For critical commentary on this work and on the case 
of Lortie, see Alain Pottage, Crime and Culture: The Relevance of the Psychoanalytical, 
55 Mod. L. Rev. 421 (1992); Marie.Jeanne Segers, Actualite de la pens~e de Pierre 
Legendre, 27 Revue Interdisciplinaire D'~tudes Juridiques 99 (1991). The best 
introduction to Legendre's work is Anton Schutz, Sons of Writ, Sons of Wrath: Pierre 
Legendre's Critique of Rational Law-Giving, 16 Cardozo L. Rev. 979 (1995). 
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death to his wife, the military Chaplain and a radio show host, M. 
Arthur. 
On the morning of Tuesday the eighth of May 1984, on the day 
which "I knew internally was my lowest point, the day of my death,"2 
Lortie put on his full military uniform and equipment, including his 
revolver and his automatic rifle. Immaculately dressed, shoes polished, 
uniform pressed and identity card in place he left the motel to do 
battle. He posted the cassette to his wife. He then drove to the radio 
station and delivered the tape intended for M. Arthur. He went next 
to the Citadel and waited in the car, listening to the radio and 
expecting his tape to be played. The interruption of the regular 
broadcast by the playing of his tape was to be the signal for his attack 
to begin. The tape was not played. Lortie panicked and left his car. He 
first fired some shots at the entrance to the Citadel and then ran 
towards the national Assembly building situated next to the Citadel. 
Lortie entered the Assembly by a side door. First, he destroyed a red 
emergency telephone which was used for internal security purposes, 
and then fired at the receptionist while shouting at her to leave. Lortie 
then ran down the corridors of the Assembly building firing at anyone 
who crossed his path. He killed three people and injured eight before 
arriving at the Chamber of Deputies-the Blue Room. As it happened, 
on the day he had chosen for his attempt to "kill the government of 
Quebec," the Assembly was not in session and the Chamber was 
empty. Lortie went and sat down in the President's chair from where 
he fired a volley of shots directly in front of him at a clock, and then 
let off some further rounds to his left and his right directed at the 
empty benches where the representatives would have sat. 
Lortie was persuaded by a Sergeant at Arms to give up his 
weapons and was subsequently arrested without being killed. When 
asked by the Sergeant at Arms why he had acted as he had, Lortie 
responded "I cannot tell you. It was not my heart but my head." While 
waiting in the police station Lortie had another vision in which he saw 
the face of an old man who mysteriously managed to make him 
understand that he would be pardoned for all his transgressions. 
Subsequently Lortie was tried, and during the course of 
interrogation and direct examination a variety of incidental responses 
throw a certain further light upon his crime. Lortie came from a family 
of six. His father had been alcoholic, violently abusive of his mother 
and of the children. The father also had an incestuous relationship 
with Lortie's eldest sister. He had been in prison on several occasions 
1 Legendre, LoRTIE, at 89. 
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and left the family while Lortie was still quite young. At one point the 
children had even banded together and hidden a number of weapons 
in the house, vowing to kill the father the next time he became violent 
with them. In replying to questions as to why he had committed the 
crime, Lortie at one point talked of losing a battle "against an inner 
negativity," a battle against a terrifying fear that he would become his 
father. Even more remarkably, he stated sometime after being arrested 
that "the government of Quebec had the face of my father." Elsewhere, 
Lortie spoke of his crime in the following terms: "I felt capable of 
destroying this authority, my strength was boundless . ..s 
A few final details need mentioning. In the tape which he sent to 
his wife, Lortie declared his love for her ("my heart is yours, my head 
is elsewhere"') and announced his intention to kill and to be killed. In 
relation both to the murders and his own annihilation, Lortie stated 
that he did not know why he would carry out these acts, he simply 
knew that he must do them, that they were imperatives. It should be 
noted also that this internal imperative to immolate himself and to 
sacrifice others was mirrored in an external form. In addition to the 
tape recordings of his intentions, the bulk of the events of May the 
eighth were recorded on security cameras in the Assembly building 
and were played back to Lortie both before and during the trial. He 
found watching these images so terrifying and so intolerable that at 
one point he fled the dock in tears and hammered his head on the 
walls of his cell. He acknowledged at one juncture that "I had to see 
them. It was the decision which I had to take. I had to pass through .... " 
At another point he responded by saying: "You know that I cannot say 
that it is not me. It is me."5 The double negative represents what, with 
only a minor injustice, might be termed an unconscious self-
identification, the attribution of an external or corporeal cause for 
which the subject has yet to take responsibility. 
The above sketch of corporal Lortie's crime does scant justice to 
the detail of the case, nor does it attempt to reconstruct the political 
and biographical contexts in which the events took place. The crime is 
treated by the French psychoanalyst and jurist Pierre Legendre as an 
exemplary one and becomes the focus of a study of the function or 
structural place of the father, and of authority or more technically 
'legitimacy,' in psychoanalysis and in law. The Lortie case in this sense 
provides both a striking introduction to Legendre's work and an 
3 Legendre, LoRTIE, at 61. 
' Legendre, LoRTIE, at 95. 
5 Legendre, LoRTIE, at 105. 
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avenue for the exploration of the relation of the legal construction of 
an institutional order to the familial constitution of the individual 
subject. Certainly in the case of Lortie it seems fairly clear that the 
boundaries between law and family, public and private, sociality and 
intimacy are hardly distinct. They were rather intertwined, trans-
gressed and blurred throughout the narrative of the murder and 
during the course of its various reconstructions. 
The extensive and expanding work of Pierre Legendre has been 
concerned precisely with that interrelation of the unconscious and the 
legal and has resolutely applied a Freudian model of analysis to the 
history and the theory oflaw. His project can be depicted most directly 
in legal historical terms as that of recovering a repressed poetics of 
law. Using a startlingly varied corpus of Latin texts, Legendre 
elaborates a theory of the subject's erotic attachment to power and a 
corresponding aesthetics of submission to law. Questions of law are 
always also questions of subjective attachment. They imply or address 
a series of institutional subjects and can never be fully accounted 
without attending to personal questions of motive and desire, fantasm 
and truth. It is this fundamentally subjective and so in some measure 
unconscious basis to the most objective of social practices which the 
case of Lortie so graphically illustrates and to which Legendre's 
philosophical project is so acutely attentive. The case of Lortie will 
therefore be used throughout the ensuing elaboration of the connec-
tions and disparities that form the shared space of the disciplines of 
psychoanalysis and law. At a more immediate level of persons rather 
than disciplines, the contribution of psychoanalysis to law can be 
phrased more simply as being that of the recognition of the 
unconscious in the practice and interpretation of law.6 In the hope of 
avoiding too didactic an account of a project which is at times delirious, 
at times poetic and on occasion closer to the medieval arts than to the 
• On recent examples of the use of psychoanalysis in Anglo-American jurisprudence, 
see Alain Pottage, Recreating Difference, 5 Law and Critique 131 (1994); David Caudill, 
Freud and Critical Legal Studies: Contour, of a Radical Socio-Legal P,ychoanaly,iB, 66 
Ind. L. Rev. 651 (1991); David Caudill, Lacan and Law: Networking with the Big O[ther], 
1 Studies in Psychoanalytic Theory 25 (1992); David Caudill, LA.CAN AND THE SUBJECT 
OF LAW: TOWARD A PsYCHOANALYTIC CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: 
Humanities Presa, 1997); Drucilla Cornell, "What Takes Place in the Dark,• in 
TRANSFORMATIONS (New York: Routledge, 1994). 
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conventions of contemporary jurisprudence, 7 the ensuing reconstruc-
tions will be grouped around specific themes. 
First, and most strikingly, psychoanalysis has long been perceived 
as too threatening or too personal a form of knowledge to be addressed 
directly in the study of law. Study of the unconscious, or 
acknowledgment of the emotions, of the body and of its repressions or 
hidden domains of desire have not figured greatly in the modern 
theories of positive law. For the discipline of law, psychoanalysis has 
remained a dark continent or 'China within.,s It threatens to disrupt 
the complacent truths of modernist jurisprudence and so also to 
question the rationality of legal practice by finally addressing the 
unconscious of institutions, and correlatively the repetitions and 
repressions, the drives and desires both of the authors and interpreters 
of law as well as of its subjects. It is thus perhaps unsurprising that 
although law is primarily concerned to judge the discourses and the 
actions of natural and corporate subjects it has studiously avoided the 
most radical of contemporary theories of the subject. In the first 
instance, the work of a psychoanalytic jurisprudence is thus to 
introduce the question of emotion and the domain of subjectivity into 
the analysis of the institution and specifically of its law. 
The introduction of a psychoanalytic perspective into the analysis 
of law and of what Legendre terms its "capture of the subject" involves 
the elaboration of a critical methodology for reading law. In Freudian 
terms it involves a 'double reading,' an acknowledgment of a relation 
between conscious and unconscious dimensions of the human subject 
and so also of the texts of law. At the level of jurisprudence or the 
theoretical analysis of law, this means a reading of the institution of 
law 'as if' it were a subject and so driven to reproduce itself. Thus at 
the level of method, Legendre has consistently used psychoanalysis to 
develop a radical theory oflaw as a social subject ceaselessly labouring 
to create subjects. In these terms psychoanalytical jurisprudence is in 
the first instance a theory of law which seeks to understand the legal 
order as the structural mechanism or social form of reproduction of 
7 On the 'heavy semantics' and 'signifier-centered-textual strategy,' see Schiltz, Sons 
of Writ, Sons of Wrath, supra note 1, at 990-991 (arguing that •Legendre ... views what is 
generally called explanation as merely some kind of side-effect of a suspect, questionable, 
and ambiguous enterprise .... For Legendre, arguments are measured by their weight 
rather than by their epistemological credentials or propositional consistency.") 
• The expression is taken from Julia Kristeva, IN THE BEGINNING WAS LoVE: 
PsYCHOANALYSIS AND FAITH 35 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987X•Is 
psychoanalysis perhaps also our China within?"). 
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subjects. Law, for Legendre, is intrinsic to the formation of the 
individual subject, and law is both historically and theoretically at the 
centre of the symbolic order in relation to which individual identity is 
formed. Where Lacan referred to the unconscious as being structured 
like a language, Legendre adds that the unconscious acts like a jurist. 
The second theme, which Legendre reiterates in varying contexts, 
concerns the specific familial form of subjectivity, whether the subject 
is an institution acting 'as if it were a natural subject or an individual. 
If the unconscious, for Legendre, is a jurist then its legalism should be 
understood in a dual sense. First, law determines the space of intimacy 
or of subjectivity, it dictates in advance the familial places, the roles 
and relationships, the 'familial fates' into which the subject is born. In 
a second and more theoretical guise, Law in the sense of the 
foundational social principle of authority is intrinsic to the symbolic 
dimension of social relations, and forms the context or 'mirror' within 
which identity is constructed in the institution. What is most striking 
about Legendre's project of re-thinking law from a psychoanalytic 
perspective is thus much less a question of the utility of psychoanalysis 
in explaining features of the subjectivity of law than it is an instance 
of reinscribing law in our understanding of the subject. In this sense 
the case of Lortie is far more than an instance of the utility of 
psychoanalysis in the explanation of the unconscious causes of a 
subject's actions. The case of Lortie is rather a vivid and, precisely 
because it is perverse, exemplary site for playing out or, more simply, 
understanding the legal categories which constitute the subject. 
To borrow a Roman law maxim, of which Legendre is fond, law's 
function is "to institute life" [vitam instituere]9 and in so doing its 
domain of application is co-extensive with the substantive domain 
addressed by psychoanalysis. What psychoanalysis provides is a 
method oflistening to and interpreting, both individual biography and 
institutional history. It allows us access to what Legendre, mimicking 
Freud, terms the "other dimension of law," namely its other scene or 
unconscious.10 In practical terms, psychoanalysis thus allows us to 
address the most complex and critical of institutional questions, those 
which relate to the subjectivity of legal practice and to what has 
• DIGEST 1. 3. 2. The passage continues •Lex est omnium divinarum humanarumque 
rerum regina" [law is the queen of all things divine and human]. See the discussion in 
Legendre, L'INESTIMABLE OB.JET DE LA TRANSMISSION 137 (Paris: Fayard, 1985). 
10 See Legendre, "The Other Dimension of Law; in David Carlson and Peter Goodrich 
(eds.), PsYCHOANALYSIS AND JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS IN LAW AND THE PoSTMODERN 
MIND (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 1997). 
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recently been termed the affectivity of law.11 A psychoanalytic 
jurisprudence could be said to address the subjective enigma-the 
delirium-of institutions, and to ask the most simple and 
unanswerable of questions. What is it that leads a subject to love the 
social representation, the living image, or emblem of law? Equally, 
what causes a subject to submit to the institution and to follow the 
law? Why is it Lortie that is mad and not the government of 
Quebec?12 
The answer to such questions can only be equivocal or contingent. 
The institution which acts 'as if it were a person is not necessarily free 
of those delirious, violent or poetic states which we term passion, 
madness or love. What is principally at issue is the ability of the 
subject to recognise its identity or place, its role within the familial 
order of institutions or of household government. Whether institutional 
or individual, madness is most immediately manifest in a failure to 
recognise where, when and to whom a subject is entitled to speak. The 
law in this context is simply the manifestation of power as a structure, 
and madness is the failure to observe the space and the images or 
faces of that manifest structure. Returning to the case of Corporal 
Lortie and his psychotic endeavour to erase the social fantasm of 
paternity, a government with the face of his father, the legal categories 
that institute subjectivity, the function, and here the failure, oflaw are 
peculiarly clear. Lortie's transgression emerged initially out of a desire 
to destroy an evil father, the social image or fantasm of paternity, the 
President of Quebec. This desire was expressed initially in terms of a 
drive to prevent the destruction of the national language. While this 
allusion to language might seem incidental, it can also be taken as the 
most fundamental of references to structure and to law. 
The third theme to be addressed relates to the particular form in 
which the institution not only acts 'as if it were a subject but also acts 
as if it had a body and so also, in Freudian terms, an unconscious. 
Since Lacan, psychoanalysis has constantly emphasised the importance 
of the fact that we are inhabitants oflanguage. To the observation that 
language is the inescapable symbolic structure into which each subject 
is born, Legendre adds that in the west we are the inhabitants of a 
11 Linda Mills, On the Other Side of Silence: Affective Lawyering and Intimate Abuse, 
86 Cornell L. Rev. 814 (1996). 
12 This question is beautifully elaborated at length in Yifat Hachamovitch, •In 
Emulation of the Clouds: An Essay on the Obscure Object of Judgement: in Costas 
Douzinas, et. al. (eds.), POLITICS, P0STM0DERNITY AND CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (London: 
Routledge, 1994). 
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very specific material form or body of language, the text or written 
reason oflaw. The reference to language, and so indirectly to texts and 
to their Western manifestation as written law, thus refers us to the 
foundational structure, the symbolic form and scriptural identity of 
Western institutions. The question of law is a question of structure, 
and for Legendre this means that it is a question of a Text-a Book or 
books-which set out the specific social places of legitimate authority. 
It is the text that establishes our social identity and institutional 
place, it is the text which provides us with our jurisdiction or right of 
speech, it is the text in which we are born and in which we die, or in 
classical legal terms, Rome-a Text, a system of law-is our common 
homeland (Roma communis nostra patria est). 13 
The structural Text, or in one etymology, the terror and the 
territory of the Western institution, has been that of Roman law and 
specifically of the Corpus Juris Civilis which was received into the 
Western tradition in the late twelfth century. It was through the 
reception of this vast corpus of texts, according to Legendre and to 
others, that the Western institution took on the historical and 
essentially juristic form that we inherit to this day.14 The reception 
of Roman law was a complicated inheritance from the two Romes, that 
of the Papacy and of canon law, and that of Justinian and the 
transmission of a predominantly imperial law. 15 The systematisation 
of these two textual systems through the categories of classical Roman 
legal science constituted what Legendre refers to as the 
twelfth-century interpretative revolution. The reception of Roman law 
provided a textual method of social organisation and of institutional 
action. It also set out the basic substantive categories of social 
11 Digest 50.1.33, discussed in Legendre, LE D~SIR POLITIQUE DE DIEU. ETUDE SUR LES 
MONTAGES DE L 'ETAT ET DU DROIT 371-376 (Paris: Fayard, 1988). See also, Tim Murphy, 
Memorising Politics of Ancient History, 50 Mod. L. Rev. 677 (1987). 
u Legendre's views on what he terms the twelfth-century revolution of the 
interpreters, can be found in LES ENFANTS DU TEXTE: ETUDE SUR LA FONCTION PARENTALE 
DES ETATS (Paris: Fayard, 1992). For other attempts to address this theme, see Alan 
Watson, THE CML LAW TRADITION (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); Harold 
Berman, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983); Donald Kelley, Gaius Noster: 
Substructures of Western Legal Thought, 84 Am. Hist. Rev. 619 (1979); and more recently 
Donald Kelley, THE HUMAN MEASURE: SocIAL THOUGHT IN THE WESTERN LEGAL 
TRADITION (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990). 
15 A maxim from Gratian transmits the essential point: Duo sunt genera 
christianorum--there are two genres of Christianity, that of the West and that of the 
East, that of the Papacy and canon law, and that of Justinian and Roman law. See 
generally Legendre, D~SIR POLITIQUE, supra note 13, at 289-318. 
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structure and of subjective life. Most notable amongst these was the 
principle of authority that attaches to the power of the father as the 
author of law. 
A fourth thematic homology between law and psychoanalysis lies 
precisely in the complex notion of the 'paternity of law.' Corporal 
Lortie's numerous references to father figures who variously command, 
refuse, absolve, and haunt, invokes not only a modem Freudian image 
of authority but also a classical legal reference. Roman law had 
attributed an absolute power-a power over life and death-to the 
head of the family, the paterfamilias. The private law right of the 
father of the household mirrored the comparable public law power of 
the emperor, the living voice of the law, whose very whim was 
legislation, and whose 'pleasure'16 had the force of law. The power of 
the emperor in its tum mirrored that of the divine father, of whose will 
the sovereign was no more than the mouthpiece or tongue. To legislate 
or speak the law was to take up a position in relation to a complex, 
textually-defined order of precedence and of the names of the law. In 
substantive terms, it was to find a place and role, an identity and 
image, within the inscribed or textual order of power. To state the law 
was literally to speak 'in the name of the father,' whether that father 
was God, the emperor, the sovereign, the People, or the head of the 
family. To take up the textually, and so also legally, defined position 
of the father is to adopt an image or role, to speak "as the law." It is 
this prior definition of the law of the Father, this abstract textual 
demarcation of the sites of legitimate social speech, that Lortie 
inadvertently recognised in explaining his parricidal intentions in 
terms of a desire (and corresponding power) to destroy "this authority," 
namely a place, origin or source rather than a mere person or vicarious 
legal office holder. 
It was, in short, an image which Lortie desired to destroy, it was 
the fantasm of paternity that constituted his "inner negativity" and 
which his crime was gauged to expunge. The image has a crucial role 
in Legendre's theory of law as in psychoanalytic interpretation more 
generally. The image, or in Roman legal terms the imago, was the 
social form of representation of the principle of authority, of Father, 
sovereign or Law. At the level of the institution, the image of 
authority, the effigy of social power or representation of collective 
belonging is an object not only of fear but also of fascination and of 
love. The image presents the absolute to the subject of law and so 
11 The classical maxim was quod principi placuit legis habet potestatem ( what pleases 
the prince has the force of law). 
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constitutes law as that discourse which can interpret, which is to say 
mediate or speak between the divine and so unknowable space of 
authority and the mundane instance of secular law. The image, 
whether of the social father or of the familial authority, fixes the Law 
within the individual subject as an ideal object of veneration or oflove. 
The image is in this sense the mechanism of subjective submission to 
social authority. At the level of the individual, the image also plays a 
crucial role in the construction of the identity of the subject as a 
subject of law. The image is here the means by which the subject is 
differentiated from itself and so acquires an identity. It is through the 
image, through seeing herself in the mirror, that the subject first 
comes to recognise a unity and separation that allows her entry into 
the social.17 
In the case of Lortie, the image had a crucial role to play at the 
level both of the social and of the individual. At the level of the social, 
it was precisely the image or the social face of authority which Lortie 
attempted to erase from the text of the living. The image or face of the 
father appears throughout Lortie's narrative and its interpretations. 
More specifically, Lortie desired to take up the place of the father but 
misrecognised that place as being that of his own father rather than 
as the abstract instance of the principle of authority. Lortie desired to 
take on the role of the father but feared becoming his own father. In 
short he confused two distinct places or functions of the image. In 
social terms, the image represents or more technically figures the 
desirability of the textual order and its hierarchy of authoritative 
places, its authors and authorities (auctor et auctoritas). The image 
passes on the unsayable dimension of that power, and as an image it 
can move between realms, as also between public and private, 
institutionality and intimacy. It is thus not altogether surprising that 
when Lortie viewed his own image, his own representation and acts, 
on a video, he was able, at least to some degree, to identify with 
himself and proclaim that "I cannot say that it is not me. It is me." His 
virtual presence in the images relayed by the video was more real for 
him as a mechanism of identification than the hyperreal experience of 
killing that he had just undergone. In more technical terms, Lortie 
could no longer deny or 'split off from' the inner negativity that was for 
17 This thesis is elaborated most famously in Jacques Lacan, "The Mirror Stage as 
Formative of the I," in ECRITS: A SELECTION (London: Tavistock, 1977). The elaboration 
of the mirror stage with respect to the formation of institutional identity, is discussed 
in Legendre, DIEU AU MIRROm. ETUDE SUR L 'INSTITtmON DES IMAGES (Paris: Fayard, 
1994). 
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him represented by the figure of the bad father whom he did not wish 
to become. 
A fifth and final observation can again return us to the case of 
Lortie and its peculiarly exemplary place in Legendre's account of the 
relationship of psychoanalysis to law. Whatever the structural relation 
or homology between psychoanalysis and law, and whatever 
significance is to be given to what Legendre coins as "the insistence of 
the law in the unconscious," the case of Lortie allows us to advert to 
another point of confluence. Both psychoanalysis and law address cases 
and so, in terms of method, both are forms of casuistry. In a sense, the 
most profound though not necessarily the most acceptable connection 
between the two disciplines is precisely the most obvious, namely their 
common history of casuistry and their analogous attempts to provide 
a normative resolution to individual cases of conflict or dispute. The 
casuistic tradition, in other words, dates back to the medieval reception 
of Roman and canon law and it entailed the reception and elaboration 
of a complex apparatus of questions of conscience or problems of ethics 
alongside the comparably normative questions of law. What is 
significant is that these various disputed questions (quaestiones 
disputatae) spanned the disciplines of moral theology and law and 
addressed cases of conscience and of law, questions of ethics and of 
legal judgement, in precisely similar terms. They alike belonged to the 
"institution oflife," to the social expression of difference, to the realm 
of things known and judged. In cruder terms, what is obvious is that 
the individual case or 'cause of action' faces the law, whether it is that 
of conscience or of the state, whether spiritual or secular, with the 
individual, with a subject of decision that is necessarily intimate and 
implicatory.18 The case requires a judgment that will address the 
subject, that will come face to face with the other, and so also with the 
unconscious, while equally bringing the unconscious face to face with 
its own law. It is in the historically complex theatre of the case and of 
the art of casuistry that Legendre finds a space within which to 
address the insistence of the law in the unconscious. 
11 Thus Caudill, LACAN AND THE SUBJECT OF LAW, supra note 6 (•If this study is 
anything-scholarly, scientific--at all, it is personal, implicatory. In trying to maintain a 
cautious distance from a theory -- Lacan's -- postulating that such distance is an illusion, 
one fears to be only striking a pose.•). See also Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of 
Righta-Consciowness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1563 (1984). 
206 Legal Studies Forum Vol. 20 
Questions of Method: The Double Reading 
The case of Lortie, the case of a son who desires to kill his father 
and who acts out that desire by endeavouring to kill the social face or 
effigy of his father, the government of Quebec, raises a peculiarly 
Freudian problem for legal analysis. 19 In Freudian terms, the Oedipal 
desire of the son to kill the father lies at the basis of all law, and it is 
this unconscious principle of authority which is lengthily elaborated in 
Totem and Taboo. 20 Freud's myth of the law's origin takes as its 
starting point the murder of the primordial father, who has 
monopolised the females of the tribe, by his sons. Overcome with guilt 
and remorse the sons then legislate against murder and thus 
inaugurate ethics and law. Both domains are governed by the memory 
of the absent father, by an image or totem that represents and reminds 
the sons of their parricidal past. Law, in the form of a totemic figure, 
a sovereign or social image of power, takes the place of the murdered 
mythical father and becomes the object of social desire. 
One way of interpreting Freud's mythical presentation of the 
totemic character of law is simply to say that the authority of law is 
inextricably bound to its mythical origins and to the symbolic forms 
which represent that myth in the contemporary public sphere. At the 
level of the social, law is necessarily predicated upon an absent source 
of authority which, in its most direct form, is variously represented as 
God, nature, reason, sovereign, or King. The symbolic order, in other 
words, rests upon an unsayable or immutable yet invisible source of 
law which can only be represented or symbolised in the various figures 
of the power of law.21 The symbolism of law, in classical terms the 
social figure of a leader or communal father, masks or screens a truth 
which cannot be directly stated or shown: "since an emperor cannot be 
present to all persons, it is necessary to set up the statue of the 
19 For an analysis of another case in which a son kills his father ("It is impossible to 
blow open the top of a man's head, says the judge in Moloney, a case about a man who 
blows open the top of a man's head, to unshell it, as it were, so as to examine his 
thinking like an oyster, or a watch-spring, or a nut•), see Yifat Hachamovitch, 'The 
Dummy: An Essay on Malice Prepensed• in Peter Rush, Shaun McVeigh, Alison Young 
(eds.), CRIMINAL LEGAL DocTRINE (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997). The case reference is 
to R v Moloney (1985] AC 905. 
IIO Sigmund Freud, TOTEM AND TABOO: RESSEMBLENCES BETWEEN THE PsYcmc LIFE 
OF SAVAGES AND NEUROTICS (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1939). 
21 Legendre, Dtsm POLITIQUE, at 266, citing Justinian, NOVELS 98, 2, 2 (post Deum 
communis omnibus pater). 
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Emperor in law courts, marketplaces, public assemblies and 
theaters-in every place, in fact, in which an official acts, the imperial 
effigy must be present, so that the Emperor may thus confirm what 
takes place, for the Emperor is only a human being and he cannot be 
everywhere."22 The space of the social is marked in advance by law. 
The unconscious of the institution here takes the form of a plastic and 
textual imaginary, while the power oflaw becomes that of an endless 
array of dignities, roles, and textual figures which bear the delegated 
authority of an absent source. Curiously institutional desire is 
prompted by a lack, the legal subject is not and cannot be the one who 
the dignity or role represents. The institution is only ever an image of 
its absent reason or cause. Similarly, at the level of the legal subject 
or individual, Freudian analysis, and, one might add, the history of 
law, suggest a comparably hidden basis or unconscious source of action 
in the drives or desires of the libidinal subject. 23 
In the first instance, the problem raised by psychoanalysis, in 
relation both to the institution and to the individual, is that although 
it is ., evident that law addresses a vast array of issues that diversely 
imply myth and the unconscious structure of social life, law has lost 
the tools for addressing such issues. The effacement of legal history 
and of the plural historical forms of legal knowledge, however, is only 
one aspect of the problem. At the level of the disciplines, the repression 
of the history of law as a social and philosophical form of life is 
symptomatic of a more pervasive legal 'will to ignorance,' which is 
expressed most directly in the lawyer's denial of the relevance of 
affectivity to judgment or desire to law. In disciplinary terms, that 
denial is replicated in an even stronger form in the jurisprudential 
repression of psychoanalysis and the willingness of the legal academy 
to act as if the discoveries of Freud and the writings of Lacan had 
either never happened or, if sufficiently rigorously ignored, would go 
away. Despite the essentially symbolic and heavily interpretative 
nature of legal regulation it is somehow easier or less threatening to 
the "graveyards"24 that pass themselves off as legal academies to 
ignore the other scene or unconscious of law.25 The supposed science 
22 Kenneth Setton, CHRISTIAN ATI'ITUDES TOWARDS THE EMPEROR IN THE FOURTH 
CENTURY 196 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1941). 
21 See particularly Sigmund Freud, BEYOND THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE (London: 
Hogarth, 1961). 
14 Legendre, L'AMOUR DU CENSEU: ESSAI SURE L'ORDRE DOGMATIQUE 14 (Paris: Seuil, 
1974). 
lll5 See Legendre, PAROLES POfflQUES tcHAPPtES DU TEXTE: LECONS SUR LA 
COMMUNICATION INDUSTRIELLE 12 (Paris: Seuil, 1982) referring to •the indolent 
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of law is deemed capable of dealing with the logic of legal rule as a 
pure surface amenable to an exclusively rational interpretation. It is 
this refusal to think about the irrational or simply subjective 
dimensions of law, this refusal to consider the symbolic significance of 
law, that leads Legendre to castigate roundly an "imbecility at the 
basis of law," and a comparable practical stupidity, in terms of which 
"lawyers do not even aspire to think," but simply circulate texts and 
other emblems of social power.26 
In the context of such a lack of thought, and more broadly in view 
of the repressive functions of law, psychoanalysis is both obviously 
relevant and obviously threatening to the discipline or 'science' of legal 
studies. The first project of Legendre's work has thus been simply to 
insist upon the relevance of psychoanalysis to legal studies, and indeed 
to any intelligent consideration of the general significance of the legal 
institution and practice of law. In this respect it is apposite to invoke 
the earlier and parallel history of the denial of psycho-analysis by 
Freud's contemporaries and institutional critics. Psycho-analysis 
threatened to rupture the dogmatic order of knowledges and it 
continues to threaten the complacency-the 'ignorance,' 'indolence' and 
'lack of culture'---of the disciplines. At the level of the disciplines, 
Legendre argues, the heretic or simply disruptive theoretical task of 
psychoanalysis is to listen to the repressed histories and abandoned or 
forgotten knowledges of the scholastic tradition as it has been 
inherited in the west through medieval law: "Where, in our day, can 
we find the heirs of the medieval jurists?"27 Who today, in other 
words, reworks the dogmatic discourse on the governance of the soul, 
on the fantasm, on faith, fascination, authority or censure? Where does 
contemporary jurisprudence account for the most prominent function 
of law, that of engendering subjective belief in authority? Psycho-
analysis in other words disturbs the masks, the distances, and the 
political compromises of the modern academic disciplines. It does so 
through its pervasive reference to the spectre of sexuality, to the figure 
of the desiring subject and so also of the role of Eros, Christian caritas, 
or love in any living form of truth and equally in any plausible account 
of law within what is still an essentially Christian culture.28 
pedagogues ... who doubtless hope that the discoveries of Freud and Lacan will disappear 
from circulation.• For further discussion of the 'dark' continent of psychoanalysis, see 
Legendre, AMOUR DU CENSEUR, at 8-9, 17-23. 
28 Legendre, L'EMPIRE DE LA vtarrt 26 (Paris: Fayard, 1983). 
27 Legendre, AMOUR DU CENSEUR, at 17. 
38 See Sigmund Freud, "Resistances to Psychoanalysis," arguing that "Psychoanalysis 
reveals the weaknesses of the [social] system and recommends that they be abandoned .... 
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At the level of institutions and so of the social history of law, 
Legendre's insistent recourse to psychoanalysis offers what he terms 
a "counter-dogmatics" or radical re-reading of the legal tradition.29 At 
the level of the institution, as also at that of the individual, law masks 
conflict and represses dispute. The theatre of legal reason exists to 
cover over the violence and the madness of power. Its function is to 
make believe that law is reason and to hide the fact that law is also 
power, and in more technical terms, that the authorship of law is 
cognate with its authority. In short, the classical "theatre of Justice 
and of Truth" (Theatrum veritatis et iustitiae)30 conceals another 
history, a latent history or positive unconscious of the legal tradition 
which contains law's failures, its lapses, its shattered dreams, as also 
it harbours its desires, its enjoyments, its reverie of a comprehensive 
system and perfect order of rational rule. In other words, there is no 
single or merely internal history of law; there are rather plural 
histories of various laws, of different jurisdictions and changing 
institutional forms. It is, therefore, the function of a psychoanalytic 
account of law to provide symptomatic readings of the history of the 
legal institution and to attend to the desires that underpin law, to 
listen to the narrative of the lawyer's love of power and to the latent 
poetry of the legal text. Legendre's work starts out, in other words, 
from the fact that the history of the Western legal tradition is a history 
of dogmatic reason and of the institutional forms of life which dogma 
inscribed as law. What is at issue in law's institution of life is not only 
a question of legal logic, it is also a matter of faith, of love, and of the 
poetry of the soul. In the latter, less rationalistic terms, it is 
Legendre's argument that the legal institution deserves to be taken 
seriously, to be interpreted in the same way as other dreams. In short, 
it deserves what Freud termed a 'double reading,' one attentive to both 
its manifest and its latent meanings. 31 
The other dimension of the Western legal tradition to which 
psychoanalysis directs our attention is that of what Legendre terms 
For having formulated these critiques, psychoanalysis, the enemy of civilisation, has been 
banned as a public danger,W cited and discussed in Legendre, AMOUR DU CENSEUR, at 22. 
29 Legendre, AMOUR DU CENSEUR, at 16-17. 
ao See Legendre, L'INESTIMABLE OB.JET DE LA TRANSMISSION. ETUDE UR LE PRINCIPE 
otNtALooIQUE EN OCCIDENT 42 (Paris: Fayard, 1985), citing the treatise of the same title 
by Jean-Baptiste de Luca (1614-1683). See also DIGEST 50.17.207: 'res judicata pro 
veritate accipitur' (the judgment of a case is received into the place of truth). 
11 For an instructive account of Freud's concept of double reading, see Sarah Kofman, 
THE CHILDHOOD OF ART: AN INTERPRETATION OF FREUD'S AESTHETICS ch. 1 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1988). 
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the "non-legal scene of law."32 It is the history of the symbolic 
materials that were used to fabricate a discourse of life and of death, 
and to institute an art of law which could address the subjective needs 
and desires of the institutional subject. The specific problem to be 
addressed initially is that of the way in which law creates not simply 
a system of rules but an aesthetic, a culture or form oflife. It is in this 
regard that psychoanalysis attempts to listen not to the apparent logic 
of legal rule, but rather to the figures of its texts and the erotics of its 
practices, of its theatre and its rites. The classical notion of an art of 
law is thus to be recuperated and interpreted quite literally, so that 
the legal scholar can begin to address directly the significance of the 
symbols, emblems, rituals, icons and diverse other signs through which 
a legal tradition establishes a culture and embeds itself in its subjects. 
The aesthetics of law and the love of power 
From a psychoanalytic perspective, the most striking feature of 
law is its desire to establish and promulgate order. In classical legal 
terms, this desire for order was expressed in a variety of ways but can 
be addressed most directly through recognising the fundamentally 
aesthetic character of institutional attachment: "The power of 
institutions is a product of their use of images ... to train the subject 
aesthetically. It was for this reason that the classical tradition marked 
out a pre-theoretical space and time of rhetoric, a time which is well 
reflected in a maxim such as: 'Nothing is more beautiful than order' 
(Nihil pulchrius ordine)."33 The first lesson of the aesthetics of law is 
that to capture the subject for the institution involves a delicate and 
complicated play of attraction and of threat and needs to be understood 
in the psychoanalytical terms of desire. Aesthetics teaches us that the 
institution of the subject requires the inscription of an image of the 
social as an object of love. More paradoxically perhaps, the subject 
must come to desire its submission to power, the subject must love the 
signs of power, the emblems of an authority which cannot be physically 
present everywhere and so must appear most usually in fantasmatic 
or imagistic forms. 
The aesthetics of law addresses the cultural desire of legal 
institutions as well as the mechanisms by means of which they attach 
32 Legendre, LoRTIE, at 69. 
3S Legendre, LES ENFANTS DU TEXTE. ETUDE SUR LA FONCTION PARENTALE DES ETATS 
55 (Paris: Fayard, 1992). To teach respect for order and through that respect, belief in 
and love for authority, was a very common glossatorial theme. 
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themselves to their subjects. In this respect, the aesthetics of law 
returns legal analysis to some of the most radical and least studied 
dimensions of the legal tradition. The history of the mediaeval legal 
tradition was a history of a dual law, of utrumque ius, u meaning that 
human law was only ever a pale reflection of a divine law and of a 
spiritual governance of secular powers. The beauty of order was a 
divine beauty and its rule addressed both earth and heaven, polity and 
spirituality. The legal construction oflife was thus in the first instance 
a spiritual endeavour because culture was a matter of ghostly or 
unseen powers and in its canonical definition "consisted in the 
observation of omens and the interrogation of the course of the 
stars. "36 What is significant in such a broad (and in this instance 
negative) definition of culture is a recognition of the plurality of 
cultural spaces and so of the forms of knowledge and of the diversity 
of objects of law's regulation. Even within the common law tradition, 
the role of the sovereign was early on defined explicitly as that of a 
'nursing father' and in consequence tutelage of the soul and governance 
of life-style or 'care of the self was recognised as being as much an 
issue of law as the more obvious and less interesting regulations of 
municipal intercourse.36 The institution is established so as to create 
subjects. It is also to be understood literally as a nursery that becomes 
a parent to children: "a mother that nourishes not those who want but 
those who follow her rule; such an allegiance already supposes an 
apprenticeship, the entry into the imaginary space of the institution 
whose subjects are infants.... The centralized organisation works 
towards the production of infants. "37 
The institution has as its goal the mad project of creating human 
subjects. It is through law, and specifically through the law, through 
the Roman categories of persons, things and actions, that the social 
subject acquires an identity and the power to act. Each subject is born 
twice, once to nature and once to law. And yet that creation of persons 
u See Legendre, •Le droit romain, mod~le et langage: De la signification de 
l'Utrumque Ius: reprinted in Legendre, ECRITS JURIDIQUES DU MOYEN AGE OCCIDENTAL 
(London: Variorum, 1985). 
111 Gratian, DECRETALS, Cause 26, Question 2, Canon 9; di8CU8sed in Legendre, AMOUR 
DU CENSEUR, at 263. 
se On the role of the sovereign as 'nursing father,' see Roger Coke, ELEMENTS OF 
POWER AND SUBJECTION OR THE CAUSES OF ALL HUMANE, CHRISTIAN AND LEGAL SOCIETY 
98 (London: T. Newcomb, 1660). See generally, Peter Goodrich, OEDIPUS LEX: 
PSYCHOANALYSIS, HISTORY, LAW 223-245 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). 
17 Legendre, JOUIR DU POUV0IR. TRArn: SUR LA BUREAUCRATIE PATRIOTE 190 (Paris: 
Editions de Minuit, 1976). 
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which is subsumed under the ius personarum or, as Legendre adapts 
it, the law of masks, 38 is not simply a matter of legal rules, it is also 
a more profound and complicated governance of drives and desires. The 
institution has to reproduce itself at the most fundamental of levels, 
it has to attach itself to the unconscious, it has enter into the space of 
desire and reproduce "an excess or beyond of that which is said .... "39 
The role of law in the institutional production or 'fabrication' of 
subjects has to be understood historically not simply in terms of a 
secular law of succession but also in terms of the transmission of a 
much more ineffable principle of authority or belief in power: "The 
great ravings of power, those which make the body walk with the soul, 
that is to say those which mobilise the unconscious towards death, can 
only be stated poetically, because power is organised fictively, and 
most particularly according to the fiction of the all-powerful. Power is 
absolutely mad because, following the Christian discourse of the 
all-powerful, power makes everything out of nothing.""° 
The madness of power, the delirium of institutions, the paternity 
of law over its infantilised subjects, is a function not of reason but of 
an art of law (ars iuris) which captures subjectivity. The institution 
and more specifically the law enters the subject not through rules but 
through language and through images. The image of power-of the 
law-giver or sovereign, of God, emperor, legislature or even something 
as unconscious as the 'rule of recognition' or 'basic norm'-is a point of 
transition between the public sphere and the private space of 
subjectivity. The structure of that entry of law into the subject is a 
structure of love, or in Augustine's terms it is structura caritatis. The 
social image of power has to become an object of desire whereby, in one 
of Legendre's most famous phrases, the subject can come to 'love the 
censor' or to enjoy power. The law must have an author and that 
author must be an object of love, a father, a name, an image that 
represents both the sanctity and the madness-the violence-of power. 
38 Legendre, DESIR POLITIQUE DE DIEU, at 225-26: •Note that one of the central 
constructions of civil law, that which, following Justinian's terminology, we call the law 
of persons, literally derives from persona-- referring initially to an actor's mask--and 
allows me to translate the formula de iure personarum by 'of the law of persons.' In all 
institutional systems the political subject is reproduced through masks. This translation 
also contributes to the rehabilitation of the problematic of the image at the heart of the 
legal order.'' For commentary on this point, see •Law's Emotional Body: Image and 
Aesthetic in the Work of Pierre Legendre," in Peter Goodrich, LANGUAGES OF LAW: FROM 
LOGICS OF MEMORY TO NOMADIC MAsKS (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1990). 
39 Legendre, L 'INESTIMABLE OB.JET DE LA TRANSMISSION: ETUDE SUR LE PRINCIPE 
GENEALOGIQUE EN OCCIDENT 140 (Paris: Fayard, 1985). 
40 Legendre, PAROLES POETIQUES, at 212. 
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The social father or law-giver is one who speaks 'in the name of' the 
principle of authority, who judges in the name of the law, who effaces 
himself so as to allow the text to speak, or in more classical terms 
"judgement is received in the space of truth. "'1 What is crucial is that 
it is by virtue of position, by virtue of speaking from the emblematic 
place of truth, that law transmits its message or passes on its form. 
The structure of political desire replicates that of faith in God and 
demands a comparable and unthinking love. Political love is directed 
towards the images of a power that is never present in a body but only 
ever represented emblematically and vicariously by the delegates ofits 
absolute yet invisible source. The sovereign may embody the law, and 
classically both the sovereign and the judiciary were thought to 
somehow incorporate the law either by carrying its spirit in their 
breast or by giving it birth in their speech, but they nevertheless were 
only ever representatives of a source of law in whose name they spoke. 
The authority of law was an abstract one which could only ever be 
mediated by its secular representatives, so much so that the medievals 
adopted the maxim that only where the body was absent could authori-
ty be present (absens corpore, praesens auctoritate). The consequence 
of the absence of any physical or indeed temporal source of law, and it 
is legitimate to observe that even in contemporary terms, the State, 
the Government or the sovereign legislature have no extant or natural 
form, the object of desire was always an impossible one. The subject, 
in other words, can love the emblems of power, the icons of law, the 
images or effigies of social authority but that love is necessarily 
directed through the image to an invisible source: "If jurists deny that 
they create the Law by means of which the administration maintains 
its legitimacy, and declare themselves to be no more than its 
transmitters, if they are simply the bearers of the most authentic of all 
possible meanings, the author of this dictation .. .is someone 
invisible. "'2 
The Poetic Rights of the Text 
The double reading which psychoanalysis suggests as the 
appropriate method for understanding the subjective force of 
institutional attachments is nonetheless a reading. Although, following 
the maxim ut pictura scriptura (painting as prose), the Western 
tradition is well aware of the various non-scriptural expressions of 
41 DIGEST 50. 17. 207 (Res judicata pro veritate accipitur) 
42 Legendre, JOUIR DU POWOIR, at 62. 
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inscription or writing, it is still the case that the principal historical 
form of power has been the body or books of written law. The abstract 
principle of power which the institution represents is not a subject and 
it cannot be referred to any specific unconscious or any individual 
body. The unconscious of the institution necessarily refers to a 
structure, and more precisely to language. The specific institutional 
form of that language is writing: "In other words, if institutions are 
both speechless and delirious, silent and raving, reasoning and 
persecuting, this cannot be in the same sense as the discourses of 
schizophrenia or paranoia, such as they are treated by the psychiatry 
of mental states. The madness of institutions is real, but it is not an 
ordinary madness: it is a sacred madness.... The system of Law 
necessarily passes through this point of delirium: the Reason of the 
Text declares itself in the same instance as the delirious questions and 
mythic fabrications of national institutions are formulated. 1143 
The structural form of the Western institution is that of written 
reason or written law. The two great textual systems of the west are 
those of divine and human law and they are expressed in complex 
codified written forms. The institution may not have a physical 
presence, but it has a body, a corpus of writing and of law. In a 
formulation which Legendre borrows from Isidore of Seville, the word 
law is cognate with reading because law is written: lex a legendo 
vocata est, quia scripta est (law comes from the word to read, because 
it is written)." At the foundation of the Western legal tradition lie 
various monumental writings, codes of divine and human law, which 
found the Western institution and establish the structural and 
fundamentally symbolic forms of social life. The insistence of the law 
in the unconscious of the Western institution is the insistence of a 
hierarchical tradition of great texts or, to borrow Legendre's phrase, 
the insistence of a Text without a subject. The textual system in 
question dates back to the earliest sacral codifications of Roman law, 
but has its major expression in Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis and the 
dogmatic tradition that developed around the reception of that vast 
compilation of law in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.45 
43 Legendre, PAROLES POfflQUES, at 53. 
" Legendre, DtSIR POLITIQUE DE DIEU, at 297, citing Isidore of Seville, ETYMOLOGIAE. 
415 For a technical account of the reception, see Legendre, LA PtNETRATION DU DROIT 
ROMAIN DANS LE DROIT CANONIQUE CLASSIQUE (Paris: Imprimerie Jouve, 1994). For an 
introductory analysis of the significance of the textual and interpretative techniques 
developed by the Romano-canonic glossatorial tradition, see Peter Goodrich, READING 
THE LAW (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986). 
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To understand the textual tradition oflaw, the classical heritage 
of ratio scripta or written reason, and the aesthetic and casuistic rules 
that developed around its interpretation, as the unconscious of the 
Western institution, again requires a double reading. The principal 
methodological contribution of psychoanalysis to law, lies in the 
demand that the textual tradition, the books and other writings oflaw, 
be treated as symptoms of a fundamentally political desire. The 
Textual system of law inscribes the specific form of the Western polity 
or institution of life and has in consequence to be understood, to be 
read and interpreted, according to the hierarchy of meanings which the 
system establishes. The Text establishes in a ritual form the order of 
texts which will constitute both the power and the meanings of social 
life. For this monumental task to be possible, it is necessary to 
understand the textual system symptomatically and to interpret the 
'work of the text' in a psychoanalytically informed manner. 
The Text of law is first a sign of sociality, a vast emblem of the 
possibility of collective being, a mirror which reflects the transcen-
dental properties of a culture, namely that culture--dignitas or 
ius-does not die. The initial or founding moment of the textual 
tradition is necessarily obscure, let us say unconscious, because the 
Text must detach itself from the discourse of municipal institutions 
and transcribe itself within the delirium or space of truth. Such is to 
say that the first task of the textual tradition is to screen the absence 
of any tangible source of authority or law. The Text must have access 
to the space of truth, the space occupied by God or nation or some 
other icon of social belief. However much a secularised tradition may 
wish to read the textual tradition more geometrico, in terms of the 
beauty of order and the logic of rules, it must first presuppose the 
phenomenon of the Text and a faith which binds us to law.46 In the 
first instance the Text does not explain so much as it implies a series 
of foundational symbols of social life: the Text establishes the subject's 
relation to death just as much as it places her in relation to the 
institution of life. 
The twelfth-century reception of Roman law inherited a notion of 
the Text of law as being the most divine of knowledges: to be learned 
in the law is the most sacred of things (res sacratissima civilis 
sapientia).' 7 Two connotations of that sanctity of the Text and of the 
" On the faith which attaches to instruments (that is to say to texts), see Legendre, 
DtSIR POLITIQUE DE DIEU, at 289-297; and also Legendre, "Expertise d'un texte," in LA 
PYSCHANALYSE EST-ELLE UNE HISTOIRE JUIVE? 93-113 (Paris: Seuil, 1981). 
'
7 DIGEST 50.13.155. For discussion, see Legendre, L'EMPIRE DE LA vtRITt, at 51-55. 
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hierarchical order of textuality deserve specific elaboration. The 
written character of law and the relation of that writing to a hidden 
divine source served to detach legal textuality from the mundane 
legibility of secular speech. That the law was written, implied a 
fatality or destiny to the social which could neither be changed nor 
disobeyed. That the law was written implied that human life was 
already inscribed and accounted within the Text and such a fatality 
could only be understood and lived-it could not be rewritten but only 
trusted and believed. The discourse of law was thus referable to the 
space of truth. What was fundamental to society, namely the truth, 
was written. It was a discourse of foundations, an inaugural speech, an 
expression of the order of things, of the various signs and other 
enigmas of the divine and of its control over life and death. The 
aesthetic of law and the dependence of law upon a fictitious space of 
origin or truth is a necessary feature of establishing the extemality of 
the authority in whose name the legislator or judge can speak the law. 
The guarantee of law is a fiction of truth, an image which establishes 
the unspeakable power of judgement and inscribes it in the 
fantasmatic space of its subjects. 
The legal concept of Text and of textual system was initially 
mystical and required comparably initiate forms of reading and 
interpretation. In a surprisingly literal sense, the Text was the body 
of the social, it was in one etymology the terror and territory of the 
social, the space and conceptual geography that a culture inhabited. 
What was necessary to law was first a belief in the Text, a faith in 
instruments, and not a mere understanding or secular use. The textual 
system represented the signs or augurs of things divine, the arcana 
iuris which addressed matters of life and death, and in consequence 
was to be approached mystagogically, through signs, through images 
and an emblematic speech. In its deepest substrate, the Text was a 
figure of truth, it was an opaque sign, a dark letter, an incompre-
hensible writing. Such a view of the textual unconscious may seem 
bizarre but it needs to be remembered that such a notion of the 
symbolic power oflaw, as well as of its opacity or indeterminacy, is not 
lacking modem representations. What psychoanalysis suggests is that 
modem law needs to recollect the incomprehensibility or irrationality 
of the Text and of the law: "It is impossible to approach Roman law 
without reinstating what I call the rights of incomprehension and the 
sense of enigma" by means of which it is transmitted.48 
"Legendre, L'EMPIRE DE WRrra, at 132. 
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The enigma or symbolic character of the Text relates to the 
foundational quality of law as the means by which a culture institutes 
life. For law to take hold of the subject, for the subject to become 
attached to law, it is necessary that the textual culture of the 
institution be capable of becoming an object of fear and oflove, just as 
its Text would literally be guarded and venerated, both as manuscript 
and as meaning, by the mystagogues of the legal tradition.'9 A system 
of law, in other words, is not simply a logic of rules or empire of 
reason, it is also a figure of attachment, a fiction or theatre of 
subjective meanings and affectivities. The desire of the lawyer to order 
the texts of law more geometrico, or in the manner of a geometry, 
already displays an aesthetic or artistic inclination.50 It takes only a 
small further step to understand that beneath that mask of order or 
screen of precision lie many other dimensions of attachment to Image, 
Text and Law. It is necessary to bind the unconscious of the subect to 
the order of texts or to the culture that the Text represents. Such is 
the exercise or jurisdiction of power over the imagination and to 
understand that power, to understand law, it is necessary, therefore, 
to acknowledge its symbolic function and its poetic qualities, its latent 
meanings, its texts. 
To establish the necessary bond between subject and law, the 
legal order depends not simply upon fear of law's violence but much 
more generally upon a structure of political love. The primary form of 
that bond or vinculum is constructed through the textuality of law. In 
several early works, Legendre is at pains to indicate that this exercise 
of power over the social subject is never simply a matter of a surface 
structure of communication. It is a matter of the aesthetics and poetics 
by means of which law establishes an unthinking adherence, a 
fantasmatic authority, an unconscious bonding, the goverance of the 
soul. It is this delirious or mythical dimension to the circulation and 
dissemination of legal texts that positivistic theories of law have lost 
and so too have denied themselves the possibility of comprehending the 
social reality of law. That reality is a symbolic one and includes not 
simply submission to known rules and apparent and comprehended 
authorities but also a much more mystical apprehension of social 
49 See Francois Hotman, ANTI-TRIBONIAN OU DISCOURS D'UN GRAND ET RENOMME 
IURISCONSULTE SUR L'ESTUDE DES LOlX, 120 (Paris: Perrier, 1603Xdiscussing the text of 
the Corpus iuris ciuiliaX"[G]uarded like a precious and sacred relic, only rarely being 
shown, at night, surrounded by candles and torches ... thus did the ancient mystagogues 
show their sacral law to the faithful.~) 
50 Legendre, JoUIR DU POUVOIR, at 162. See also, Jacques Lenoble and Francois Ost, 
DROIT, MYTHE ET RAISON (Bruxelles: Presse Universitaire de Saint Louis, 1981). 
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structure and of Law as the Western form of fate spelled out in nature 
or in the living bodies or speaking signs of political and legal 
authority.61 The right to incomprehension or to poetry which 
Legendre elaborates, is in essence a right to interpretation in the 
strongest of senses, a right to love and to a life of the soul which 
understands that the meaning of written reason or of Text is both 
secular and spiritual, of the surface and of the soul: "The reproduction 
of institutions takes place through a discourse of fiction concerned with 
the internal structure or space of the imaginary .... The discourse of 
fiction is in this sense a logic of commentary and it extends so as to 
deploy the various signs around which the fantasmatic body of the 
subject is elaborated. "62 
The structure of subjective identification with the institution 
depends upon the manipulation of the subject around the imaginary 
sites of the text. It requires a rethinking of the text in terms of a latent 
poetics which takes hold of the subject and institutes its soul through 
an unconscious desire or unspeakable symbolism of law. It requires 
that we understand a certain madness or poetry of the text, a meaning 
that lies beyond the prosaic or dead letter of the law, one which 
inhabits a domain of living law, of the theatre of justice and the 
judgment of truth. It is here that we can refer to what the mediaeval 
jurists termed officium poetae, the poetic function, which was to say 
what could not be said other than through poetry, through metaphor 
and the figures of speech which has elsewhere been termed the lover 
at work in discourse. 63 The text, in other words, is an initiate or 
sacral form of knowledge. It is the discourse of the imaginary other, it 
is a letter which falls from the sky, a poetic mask and so also an object 
oflove. It is with that love or structura caritatis, that Legendre begins: 
"What is exquisite in the discovery of a manuscript is precisely that 
one does not understand. The letter arrives, addressed and received, 
yet unreadable. The discovery of a manuscript is a poetic event, an 
event of writing. An unknown writing plays on the imagation like a 
51 With regard to the various classical formulae for the legislator: lex animata, lex 
loquens, viva vox iuris, and indeed the notion that law, reading and delirium are closely 
connected (loi, lire, delire); see Legendre, Dtsm POLITIQUE DE DIEU, at 267 and 293. 
52 Legendre, PAROLES POfflQUES, at 137; see also 53-55, 57-66. 
u On the officium poetae, see also Placentinus, "Senno de legibus: the text of which 
is reproduced in Herman Kantorowicz, The Poetical Sermon of a Medieaval Jurist. 
Placentinus and his •sermo de Legibus, 2 J. Warburg and Courtauld Institute 22 (1938); 
and Peter Goodrich, Translating Legendre: The Poetical Sermon of a Contemporary 
Jurist, 16 Cardozo L. Rev. 963 (1995). The reference to Barthes is to A LoVER'S 
DISCOURSE: FRAGMENTS 158 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1979). 
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painting .. .it is an illegible letter addressed to the subject who would 
desire it. "64 
The psychoanalytic jurist's reference to the poetry of the text and 
more strongly to the function of poetry in the institution of law finds 
ample expression within the history of the Western legal tradition. The 
text was always to be understood as containing a hidden meaning or 
poetic core and it was this fantasm or beyond of the word that the 
Christian legal tradition taught lawyers to address. It was to this 
latent meaning of the text, this 'other world of interpretation,' that the 
power of writing was addressed. There was both "that which was 
written and something else that was there, something more. It was 
this something more that Justinian evoked in Novel 146 under the 
formula non solis litteris adhaerare, meaning literally to adhere not 
only to the letters."55 The letter of the law was never self-sufficient 
and the mediaeval tradition was at great pains to emphasise that 
methods of legal commentary and interpretation depended upon a 
complex of rhetorical and extrinsic techniques of construction and 
evaluation of the text. For the glossatorial tradition the text was only 
ever a more or less complex sign of what Bude termed "the spirit of 
Latinity," an interlinear meaning, a spiritual or anagogic sense which 
the words both harboured and veiled. It was thus possible for the 
lawyers of the reception both to believe in the absolute reason of 
written law and to adhere to the maxim that writing is not the 
substance of law (scriptura non est substantia legis).66 In a language 
that in many respects comes close to that of psychoanalysis, the 
interpreter of the law was subject to a series of protocols which 
emphasised in detail the plurality and the power of textual meaning. 
I will simply avert to the most standard of traditional protocols 
of legal reading, namely that it is not the letter but the spirit that 
determines the meaning of law. The text is composed of dead letters 
(litera mortua),67 the rule is no more than a "mute judge," a sleeping 
114 Legendre, PAROLES POETIQUES, at 221. 
66 Legendre, D~IR POLITIQUE DE DIEU, at 295. 
1541 Legendre, Dtsm POLITIQUE DE DIEU, at 316. With respect to the philological views 
of Guillaume Bud~, see DE PHILOLOGIA 47, 143 (Paris: Vascosan, 1536), discussing 
literarum studium and the spirit of Latinity. 
a7 This Pauline distinction can be found in Francis Bacon, THE ELEMENTS OF THE 
COMMON LAWES OF ENGLAND (London: I. More, 1630) at A 2 a: •for if it be true that 
silent leges inter arma, it is also as true, that your majesty is in a double respect the life 
of our lawes: once, because without your authority they are but litera mortua, and 
againe, because you are the life of our peace, without which lawes are put to silence .... " 
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form58 requiring the interposition or anima legis of jurist or judge. 
What is significant is not that the law is an unconscious text, a 
symptom, intensity or spirit, but rather that the meaning of law is 
internal to its living body, viva vox iuris, lex loquens, its image, 
interpreter or legislator. In classical terms, it is spelled out by 
reference to something beyond words: "To know the law is not to know 
the words of the law, but its force and power."59 In a Renaissance 
formulation we are similarly told that "no words, forms, niceties, or 
propriety of language is of any regard in the Civil Law, in comparison 
to truth, faithfulness and integrity. For verba menti, non verbis servire 
debet; words are made as instruments to serve and express the mind, 
and not to command it. "60 Truth, in other words, might be captured 
by writing but it could only be discovered by an interpretation that 
went beyond the words and participated in the delirium of the text. In 
Sir Edward Coke's formulation, "in reading it is not the words but the 
truth which ought to be loved (in lectione non verba sed veritas est 
amanda)."61 In short, the jurist requires the reader or subject of law 
to love, and in doing so refers to a latent meaning or power, namely 
the capacity of the text to elicit subjective adherence, a faith or caritas 
that belongs not only to the secular letter of the law, but also refers to 
the space of the divine. Beyond the letter or between the lines, the text 
embodies a passion, truth or spirit that belongs to the time of structure 
and to the inaugural space of reference and of Law. It was for this 
reason that Renaissance lawyers understood that legal meaning could 
only properly be found in the soul or heard beside or beneath or 
beyond the text, subauditio or subintellectio as an intuition, image or 
unconscious form. 62 
158 See particlularly Sir John Davies, •A Discourse of Law and Lawyers," in A.B. 
Grosart (ed.), SIR JOHN DAVIES: COMPLETE WORKS 275-277 (London: private circulation, 
1876X1615)(Volume 2). In a different context, see John Selden, THE DUELLO OR SINGLE 
COMBAT: FRoM ANTIQUITIE DERIVED INTO THIS KINGDOME OF ENGLAND 21-22 (London: 
I . Helme, 1610). For commentary, see Donald Kelley, THE HUMAN MEASURE: SOCIAL 
THOUGHT IN THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION ch. 10 (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1990). 
69 DIGEST 1.3.17 (Celsus) Scire leges non hoc est uerba earum tenere, sed uim ac 
potestatem. 
80 Sir Robert Wiseman, THE LAW OF LAWS OR THE EXCELLENCY OF THE CML LAW 
ABOVE ALL HUMANE LAWS WHATSOEVER 70 (London: Royston, 1664). 
81 Sir Edward Coke, REPORTS (London: Rivington, 1777Xat Part III fol C 7 b). 
82 On the significance of subauditio and subintellectio see Ian Maclean, 
INTERPRETATION AND MEANING IN THE RENAISSANCE: THE CASE OF LAW 166-175 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). The great advocate of traditio-the 
unwritten institutional wisdom of tradition-in the common law tradition was Sir 
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Dogmatics and Domesticity 
In its most radical reading, Legendre's analysis of the legal 
structure of social life suggests that the function of the lawyer is most 
frequently an unconscious one. In the long term, it has not been the 
role of the lawyer to think or to write but rather to represent, to speak 
'in the name' of the law, to be an instrument of the text or the voice of 
an authority or paternity exterior to him. Thus the lawyer counts for 
nothing in the epiphany of law: "The enclosure of law is a space of 
silence, it harbours nothing more than a set of highly valuable 
techniques and the protocols of their application. The State depends 
upon its jurists, precisely because they silence themselves. "63 The 
lawyer is by tradition a messenger through whom someone else will 
speak, he is the tool by means of which a greater authority, be it God, 
nature, reason or sovereign, will write the law. In this sense, the 
oracular role of the jurist is not to speak but to be spoken through, and 
so to provide access to the unconscious space or immobile time within 
which authority and law, reason and power are one.'u In Legendre's 
terms it is the principal symbolic function of law precisely to maintain 
or keep open the blank space of the social unconscious against which 
a culture can maintain its myths and preserve its relation to poetry, 
art and justice, fate or Law. The lawyer deals unwittingly with Law 
and yet the role of the lawyer is intrinsic to the maintenance of the 
symbolic structures of social life. In Lacan's terms there has to be an 
ignorance that puts truth to work. 611 
The place of truth or discourse of fate to which Law refers is 
understood by Legendre in a classical Freudian sense. Law functions 
to 'capture' the subject, to generate a submission to authority, and to 
instigate a love of political power, in the specific form of the Western 
institution. In one sense this means that the lawyer unconsciously 
elaborates a dogmatics, a discourse of axiomatic social categories 
within which the subject finds her place in relation to the extant order 
of power. This, in Legendre's terms, is the discourse of genealogy, of 
Thomas More. For discussion of his apologetic and polemical works, see Goodrich, 
LANGUAGES OF LAW, supra note 38, at 72-82. 
83 Legendre, PAROLES POfflQUES, at 149. 
84 For an eloquent elaboration of this point, see Alain Pottage, "The Paternity of Law; 
in Costas Douzinas, et. al. (eds.), POLITICS, POSTMODERNITY AND CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 
148-150 (London: Routledge, 1994). 
96 Jacques Lacan, EcRITS: A SELECTION 296 (London: Tavistock, 1977)X"Truth is 
nothing other than that which knowledge can apprehend as knowledge only by setting 
its ignorance to work.•) 
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the transmission of power across the generations. It establishes the 
subject's familial fate68 and provides him or her with a pre-ordained 
place and role, and in the last instance an identity, within the order 
of social life: "The fundamental axis of Roman law is the idea of the 
Father as the institutional formulation of the principle of Reason. It is 
the idea of God itself, as that in which we believe. ne7 The system of 
Roman law is a familial one and it is precisely the common link 
provided by the juridical principle of the family that binds the subject 
to the institution. In this sense, the social construction of the subject 
is to be understood as an intrinsically legal enterprise, because the 
categories of lineage or of family place are the fundamental categories 
oflaw. 
At the level of the social, the classical order of interpretation and 
of law descended in a hierarchical fashion from the divine father and 
author of all laws. The concealed origin of law was screened by the 
juridical image or figure of an ancestral or first source, which was 
repeated throughout the social order of reason, text and law. Each 
subsequent authority imitated the inaugural sovereignty of the author 
of law, so that, for instance, Justinian described his own sovereignty 
as being that of one who was, "after God, the common father of 
everyone" within the Empire.68 The principle of authority took the 
form of a legal designation of paternal power and its repetitive 
imitation in the order of institutional offices, dignities or roles. The 
genealogical principles of succession which governed this "inestimable 
object of transmission" legitimated authority by reference to the 
hierarchical order by means of which the power to found and interpret 
laws descended from its original and Pontifical source.69 
The Freudian construction of the social in terms of a family 
governed by a series of paternal sources of law is, for Legendre, the 
founding metaphor of Western institutions: "My theory is that the 
State is the story of a family, in the Freudian sense ... ofbrothers who 
are in love with their parents and at war with each other."70 The 
crucial link between the institution and the subject thus takes the 
111 Legendre, LoRTIE, at 27-33; see also, Pierre Legendre, "Analecta: in Alexandra 
Papageorgiou-Legendre, FILIATION. FONDEMENT otNtAl.oGIQUE DE LA PSYCHANALYSE 
(Paris: Fayard, 1990). 
17 Legendre, DtSIR POLITIQUE DE DIEU, at 265. 
88 NOVELS 98, 2, 2 "post Deus communis omnibus pater: See also Legendre, DtsIR 
POLITIQUE DE DIEU, at 267. 
811 Code 1, 14, 12: "potestas condendi leges et interpretandi: Discussed in Legendre, 
DtsIR POLITIQUE DE DIEU, at 111. 
70 Legendre, PAROLES POfflQUES, at 148. 
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form of the social construction of the family and is expressed most 
specifically in the legal definition of the place and power of the father 
within the domestic family: "Power within the family derives from a 
very precise order of political legitimacy. The function of the father in 
Roman law could not have developed if it were not bound to power 
within the city .... Paternity, in the full Roman sense of the status of 
the pater familiae [head of the household], is not separable from the 
political characteristics expressed by the concept of citizen (civis)."71 
The power of the father is not self-founding, it is legally instituted and 
belongs within an order of names that descend from an absolute 
Father, be that God, the People, or the Republic or America. It is 
within the family that blood and love, law and pleasure are most 
directly mixed and contained. It is for this reason that psychoanalysis 
has such a crucial role to play in the development of a concept of the 
legal construction or 'fabrication' of the subject, and it is for this reason 
that an analysis of law cannot escape addressing either the role of the 
father in the institution or the role of the institution in the father. 
Both systems of power, public and private, are bound to a common 
lineage, kinship or filiation, whereby the subject, the legally instituted 
persona, is constructed and bound to the absolute, to the principles of 
a power that transcends mortality and that survives across the 
generations. At its most basic, the subject is born into an order of 
precedence, which the glossators termed a law of the living (vivendi 
leges): "defined as the general order of life, organised for humanity in 
terms of a familial communication with God ... one which, according to 
Rufinus, takes place by reference to the vertiginous rules of a 
genealogical ceremony, one which celebrates the order of a God who is 
Father of the family, and who institutes the places of his celestial 
family (celestis familie officinas)."72 The celestial Father is explicitly 
the model or prototype (pater prototypus) of all lesser forms of 
paternity and by the same token the mundane family replicates the 
spiritual order or hierarchy of family places. The domestic family 
structure, in other words, is the point of entry into the symbolic, and 
the places and roles which the family designates imply a law which 
71 Legendre, L'INESTIMABLE OB.JET DE LA TRANSMISSION, at 172. See further, Alain 
Pottage, A Unique and Different Subject of Law, 16 Cardozo L. Rev. 1161, 1198 
(1995Xdeveloping the concepts of admiration and personality): "The most basic role of 
law as moral or cultural tutor is in notifying each subject of this condition of 
individuation and limitation ... This imposes a juridical art; that of being maieutic tutor, 
cultivating the uniqueness of the subject within its juridical genre .... What seems most 
unthinkable is the very notion of a liberating or fulfilling juridical personality.• 
72 Legendre, L'INESTIMABLE OB.JET DE LA TRANSMISSION, at 248. 
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attaches itself to the most intimate or private spaces of subjective life, 
a law that embeds itself within the affective structure of the 
individual, a law that belongs to what Freudian jargon terms the 
unconscious. 
What is crucial to Legendre's analysis of the subject is the 
recognition that the individual is born into law and is an individual 
only by virtue of law. Within the Christian tradition the image of God 
comes from inside, and the maxim that "I am in the father and the 
father is in me" refers directly to the unbroken chain of paternal 
authorities whereby tradition captures the subject in the very moment 
of its institution as a subject. In Roman law a corresponding principle 
defined father and son as being the same person (pater et filius easdem 
esse persona)13 and ordained the submission of the child to the person 
into whom they were born. The father was to be obeyed in the same 
sense as the law was to be venerated for being what the tradition 
poetically termed the image of the substance of the father.7' The 
structures of familial life, the early demarcation of domestic roles and 
subjective places belong to the internal history oflaw, a history of the 
soul and of its marking by law. What law institutes, in other words, is 
not simply an exterior limit or subjection but equally an interior 
emotional structure which will bind the subject through fear and 
through love, through fascination and through fealty, to the theatre of 
justice and truth. However much jurists may seek to deny it, there is 
an affective dimension to the institution without which the ritual of 
judgment and of interpretation of laws would be of minimal 
consequence if not simply impossible. 
Postface 
It is Legendre's argument that in the same sense that precedent 
inscribes a prior law or judgment that allows subsequent cases to be 
treated normatively by reference to the repetition of authoritative 
rules, so the psyche is also marked by and finds its place or persona 
within a previously ordered domain of familial authority. The internal 
principle or inscription of authority also helps explain the coincidence 
of power and love, of normativity and desire. The institutional 
structure of submission is infantile, the subject loves the law like a 
child loves its parents. The filial nature of political desire or love of law 
73 Code 6, 26, 11; discussed in Legendre, L'INESTIMABLE OBJET DE LA TRANSMISSION, 
at 171-73. 
7
' (paternae imago substantiae); see Legendre, D~m POLITIQUE DE DIEU, at 242. 
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is a constant theme within the legal tradition, and like any falling in 
love it implies an unconscious or a beyond of desire that exceeds the 
individual and so places the subject in a relation with legality. In one 
early common law formulation: "To fear God is the effect of the law .... 
This fear is as a son's fear for his father ... this fear is promoted by the 
law."76 As the case of Lortie earlier suggested, the filial fear of law is 
most immediately a response to the power of the father and is only 
later a respect or love for the exterior images, rituals or ceremonies, by 
means of which the social principle of paternity is inscribed. 76 The 
exterior forms oflaw are explicitly fictions in which the institution acts 
as if it were a subject, a father, and equally as if its subjects were its 
children. 
The first task of a psychoanalytic theory of law was spelled out 
by Legendre in one of his first works in terms of"the need to reinscribe 
the link between the structures that surface during the course of 
psychoanalysis and the institutions which are materialised in legal 
discourse .. .in both cases there is but one text, which solemnises 
conflict, excludes alternative interpretations and methodically follows 
the path of its subject." The two discourses develop in parallel and it 
is the task of legal theory to move from one to the other and so to 
elaborate the mechanisms that tie the subject to its social place: "We 
do not yet know how to pass from one domain to the other, from the 
drama of analysis in which the patient develops his or her own spoken 
text to the juridical simulation in which, under the mask of writing, 
the Law speaks .... "77 
Legendre's proposal for relating or reconciling the two 
foundational levels of legal socialisation is to suggest a systematic 
correspondence between the two orders. In Legendre's analysis the 
legal structure mimics the psychic structure for the simple historical 
reason that the scholastic categories which were elaborated to govern 
the soul (regimen animarum) were to a very considerable extent 
coincident with the dogmatic categories of social regulation. The lesson 
of genealogy is precisely that both subject and law descend from the 
same system of names, the same dogmatic order of categories and 
classifications, from the same familial structure of meaning: "The most 
private, the most intimate, that which is at the heart of the concept of 
a subject, to know the fantasm, is already marked by the seal of the 
76 Sir John Fortescue, DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM A.NGLJAE 3 (London: Gosling, 1737X1468). 
71 Thus Gratian, DECRETAI.S, c. 16, q.3, c. 17: "venerandae romanae leges• (the laws 
of Rome must be venerated). 
77 Legendre, L'AMOUR DU CENSEUR, at 249. 
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genealogical order. All subjects carry within them, if I can express 
myself in this way, the institutional order under the primary form of 
familial institution. "78 In dogmatic terms, the child is a portion of the 
mother's entrails79 and bears the image of the father, his similitudes 
or likenesses-vestigiis et similitudinibus-on the soul. 80 
In some of his later work, Legendre has revived the classical 
conception of the Fates to depict the largely ignored prescriptive and 
providential dimensions of law. The Fates spoke the subject in 
advance. They indicated that the individual entered an institution of 
life and that the individual was destined to die. The subject thus 
experiences the institution of the family as a prior order or fate, as a 
first law which can neither be resisted nor evaded. The crime of 
Corporal Lortie can in this respect be treated by Legendre as fated to 
happen by virtue of a genealogical failure, namely that Lortie was born 
into a family which had transgressed the order of familial places: not 
only was his father a tyrant who recognised no limits to his violence 
but he also engaged in incestuous relations with his children-Lortie's 
youngest 'sister' was the child of his eldest sister. Wishing to kill the 
government of Quebec-"the government which had the face of my 
father" -the accused sought the restoration of the Father: "He killed 
the person who, in the concrete life of his family, represented the 
transgression of the taboos and the principle of differentiation. This 
was the tragedy in which Lortie, at the cost of his own life and that of 
his unfortunate victims, sought to found himself and to live. This was 
in short a genealogical crime. "81 There was, in other words, no order 
of meaning, of names or places, into which Lortie could be inscribed. 
There was no law to recognise and no law to observe. If such was true 
at the fantasmatic level of the subject, it was equally true at the level 
of the social enactment of Lortie's parricidal desire. 
The failure of meaning which characterised Lortie's biography 
and his crime can serve to draw attention to a second order of 
homology between psyche and law. The two instances of the subject 
share the fact and the sociality of language and gain their expression 
and their representation through speech and through writing. The 
psychic text and the legal text are comparable objects of interpretation 
78 Papageorgiou-Legendre, FILIATION, at 33. 
n Fortescue, DE NATURA LEGIS NATURAE 240 (1466), reprinted in THE WORKS OF SIR 
JOHN FORTESCUE (London: private distribution, 1869Xportio est viscerwn maternwn). 
80 Fortescue, DE NATURA LEGIS NATURAE, at 233. 
81 Legendre, LoRTIE, at 141. Alain Pottage remarks that "Lortie's inheritance was a 
hand of genealogical cards that his father had not played." Pottage, "Crime and Culture," 
supra note 1, at 431. 
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and, by virtue of the commonality of language, belong to the same 
institutional order of meaning. One could hazard that the law speaks 
as if it were a subject, while the subject speaks as if it were a law. 
Language, in other words, is irremediably social, a fact which 
necessarily engages the psychoanalyst in the juristic enterprise of 
interpretation and more broadly in the tragedy of the dogmatic 
institution of life: "What does it mean to communicate? The reference 
to law suggests a wide-ranging response: law communicates orders. 
And yet normativity cannot be reduced to a mere play of appearances, 
it mobilises a much more subtle set of human relations. Communicatio 
is a substantive derived from communis. In other words, normative 
communication implies making things common, making something 
common which must not remain private. "82 Because the subject 
speaks and because the subject's speech must be interpreted, language 
implicates the psyche in the institutional order of reproduction, in the 
genealogical relay that is law for us. 
The case of Lortie also allows the specification of a further site of 
commonality between psychoanalysis and law. It is that of the fantasm 
and of the image as the vehicles of subjective attachment. The order 
of law is a theatre of truth. The institution is built upon fictions, 
represented through images, repeated through rituals and elaborated 
through the simulated categories of a collective subject or will. The 
age-old war of texts is complemented and at times exceeded by the war 
of images. Law relies upon images because it is through images that 
the legal subject is most directly affected by law. The power and hence 
also the danger of the image was the primary force that motivated the 
various movements of reform and counter reform within ecclesiastical 
history. The image was politically effective but also potentially 
corrupting; too great a love of images (latria) would distract the subject 
from the dictates oflaw, while an absence of images would deprive the 
law of subjects. Thus the concern of lawyers to govern images and to 
regulate the social forms of representation, the theatre and the ritual 
of government and of law.83 The image is cognate with the imaginary 
and it is through the image that law is most directly linked to the 
mechanisms of subjective attachment or to the direction of individual 
desire. The case of Lortie is a case of the failure of the ius imaginum, 
of the representation of the order of successsion. Lortie had no 
legitimate identity because he had no image with which to identify, no 
imaginary space within which to found his own project, and hence he 
82 Legendre, L'INESTIMABLE OBJET DE LA TRANSMISSION, at 166. 
83 For a history see Goodrich, OEDIPUS LEx, supra note 36, at ch. 4 & 5. 
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felt the need to kill an external father-a bad father-so as to make 
room for a good father within. 
The theatre of law, the images, symbols and rites around which 
law is identified and reproduced, are also domains of attachment or 
subjects of love. The role of the image in the imaginary is to incite 
attachment and to focus desire or love upon circumscribed social 
objects of affection or legitimate political sites. The structure of social 
love is one of the great enigmas of political power and one of the most 
opaque of the features of the history oflaw. The proximity of the image 
to enigma deserves a parting word. The project of a psychoanalytic 
jurisprudence is linked to a desire to understand more and not less 
about law. In Legendre's depiction, it could be said to belong to a 
venerable scholastic project concerned with the pursuit of an 
impossible knowledge: "the celebrated interrogation {ides querens 
intellectum, word for word, faith in search of understanding, faith in 
search of intelligibility."u The conjunction of desire and law, of love 
and power, is not only a fertile ground for understanding the 
mechanics of law's governance of the subject and so its inscription 
upon the soul. It is also potentially the site of the recovery of law's 
difference. The case of Lortie can remind us that in the most tragic of 
senses a subject without images, a subject who cannot see himself, is 
a subject without identity and so without any consciousness of law. 
More than that, a psychoanalytic reading of the history oflaw can also 
remind modernity of the unconscious significance or latent meanings 
of law. The poetics of legal texts, the art of justice and more broadly 
the aesthetics of legal order are all parts of a history of resistance to 
a unitary or positivised and closed order of legality. Legendre reminds 
us that poetry and the poetics of the text signaled amongst other 
things "the insurrection of desire against the institution. ml5 Poetry 
and in varying degrees the other legal arts, painting and music in 
particular, suggest a history and an erotics which wrote against power 
and implied the possibility of using or interpreting law to other ends. 
M Legendre, L'INESTIMABLE OBJET DE LA TRANSMISSION, at 131. 
86 Legendre, PAROLES POfflQUES, at 53, 
